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Abstract 
This study examined the potential role of catastrophic cognitions in mediating threat 
expectancy during fear conditioning and extinction in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD). It was hypothesised that participants with PTSD would display heightened 
catastrophic thinking and greater threat expectancy during fear extinction; the 
potential for catastrophic cognitions to mediate the relationship between PTSD 
symptom severity and threat expectancy during fear extinction was also assessed. 
Fifty-nine participants (21 PTSD, 19 TEC, and 19 NTEC) completed measures of 
catastrophic thinking (CCQ-M and PTSI) and the differential fear conditioning and 
extinction paradigm. The PTSD group demonstrated significantly greater trauma-
specific catastrophic thinking than both control groups, but group differences in more 
generalised catastrophic cognition were non-significant. The PTSD group also 
exhibited more rapid fear acquisition and impaired fear extinction. Trauma-related 
catastrophic thinking did not mediate the relationship between PTSD symptoms and 
threat expectancy in the early extinction phase of the fear conditioning paradigm. 
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       Most people experience trauma at some point in their lives, but the development 
of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in response to trauma is relatively rare. 
Trauma is the emotional reaction to an extremely disturbing or stressful event such 
as an accident, interpersonal violence, terminal diagnosis, or natural disaster. The 
American Psychological Association (APA) describes trauma as resulting from 
“exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence” (Criterion 
A, APA, 2013, p. 271). Survivors respond differently to traumatic events, but in most 
cases these symptoms subside over the first week. However, for a minority, 
symptoms persist beyond one month or have a delayed expression, and the 
psychopathological response to trauma may be clinically identified as PTSD (APA, 
2013). The projected lifetime risk for PTSD is 6.4% in Australia (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, 2007), and individuals with PTSD are 80% more likely to meet 
diagnostic criteria for another mental disorder (APA, 2013). The Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) Fourth Edition Revised (DSM-IV-
TR; APA, 2000) specifies that a cluster of re-experiencing, avoidance, and 
hyperarousal symptoms be present for diagnosis, and the Fifth Edition (DSM-5; 
APA, 2013) also indicates that negative changes in mood and cognition are 
experienced. However, the diagnosis of PTSD offers little insight into the 
mechanisms underlying its development and persistence. Two key models have 
emerged within the literature to explain why some people develop PTSD: a 
biological model which suggests PTSD evolves from impaired extinction of 
conditioned fear (Pitman et al., 2012); and a cognitive model which proposes that 
PTSD arises due to maladaptive appraisals and disturbed memory coding (Ehlers & 
Clark, 2000). Both models are well supported by empirical studies (for e.g., Bryant 
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& Guthrie, 2007; Lommen, Engelhard, Sijbrandij, van den Hout, & Hermens, 2013), 
but research investigating how the biological and cognitive models of PTSD overlap 
is scarce. As threat expectancy learning is critical for the acquisition and extinction 
of fear (Lovibond, Mitchell, Minard, Brady, & Menzies, 2009), the current study 
explores whether fear extinction learning is mediated by cognitive processes.  
Cognitive Model of PTSD    
       Cognitive Schema Theory (Beck; Foa & Rothbaum). Beck expanded on 
Piaget’s description of schemata as cognitive structures (Beck, 1967; Piaget, 1948) 
by considering their role in information processing. Schemata have since been 
described as core beliefs or stable cognitive patterns that form the basis for how an 
individual attends, interprets, codes, stores and retrieves an experience (Beck, Rush, 
Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Eysenck, 1992). Everybody develops schemata about 
themselves, others and the world and these affect emotional and behavioural 
responses. Individuals with catastrophic schemata would more readily interpret their 
external and internal environment in a way that is congruent with such schemata, 
thus perceiving threat even when faced with contradictory, ambiguous or neutral 
stimuli (Clark & Beck, 2010; Eysenck, 1992; Padesky, 1994). Maladaptive schemata 
thus play a central role in the development and maintenance of disorders such as 
PTSD (Padesky, 1994). 
       Foa and Rothbaum (1988) proposed that dysfunctional self schema (“I am totally 
incompetent”) and dysfunctional world schema (“the world is completely 
dangerous”) mediate the development of PTSD. They suggest that these schemata 
can emerge if the trauma either activates similar rigid prior beliefs about the world 
being dangerous and one being incompetent, or that the trauma violates a rigid belief 
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that the world is safe and one is capable so that the traumatic experience cannot be 
interpreted and assimilated as a unique experience. Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin and 
Orsillo (1999) developed the Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI) to measure 
these negative trauma-related cognitions about the self, self-blame and the world. 
Bryant and Guthrie (2005) found that only pre-trauma maladaptive cognitions about 
the self predicted posttraumatic stress. Similarly, Moser, Hajcak, Simons and Foa 
(2007) only found negative cognitions about the self to be related to PTSD symptom 
severity in their study of trauma-exposed college students.  
       Cognitive Appraisal Model (Ehlers and Clark).  Ehlers and Clark (2000) also 
conceptualised PTSD from a cognitive perspective, proposing that the development 
and maintenance of the disorder are dependent on a sense of persistent current threat 
caused by individual differences in two key cognitive processes: the first being the 
appraisal of the trauma and/or its sequelae. If the individual negatively appraises the 
trauma, their own response, or the reaction of others, then they are more likely to 
have a strong sense of current threat. Re-experiencing the trauma (through intrusive 
thoughts, nightmares or flashbacks) consolidates or amplifies this sense of threat 
(Dekel, Peleg, & Solomon, 2013), and avoiding trauma-related stimuli prevents 
individuals from realising the threat is no longer present.  
       The second key cognitive process implicated in Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) model 
of PTSD relates to how the trauma memory is coded and linked to other 
autobiographical memories. Ehlers and Clark (2000) suggested that an inability to 
form a self-referential perspective when encoding the trauma memory means that its 
integration into biographical memory is inhibited, and intentionally recalling the 
event is made difficult. This lack of self-referential perspective may be due to the 
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extreme nature of the trauma and its violation of previously held beliefs about safety, 
predictability and controllability in relation to oneself, others, and the world in 
general (Foa, Steketee, & Rothbaum, 1989). The violation of these beliefs may be 
responsible for further promoting a sense of current threat.  
       PTSD sufferers tend to have fragmented memory of their trauma, with strong 
sensory impressions that are easily triggered, but poor conceptual processing of 
context and meaning (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). It is suggested that this fragmentation 
may be due to dissociation during trauma (van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995). The 
fragmented and highly arousing nature of these trauma memories is thought to 
reduce an individual’s ability to contextualise flashbacks as autobiographical 
memories; instead they are vividly experienced as if occurring in the present 
(Brewin, 2007; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Siegel, 1995).  
Negative Appraisals and PTSD 
       Empirical research indicates that negative or catastrophic appraisals (before, 
during or in response to trauma and its sequelae) predict the development and 
maintenance of posttraumatic stress (Bryant & Guthrie, 2005; Dunmore, Clark, & 
Ehlers, 1997; Halligan, Michael, Clark, & Ehlers, 2003). For example, Bryant and 
Guthrie’s (2005) study of 82 trainee fire fighters found that greater pre-trauma 
negative appraisals of oneself were associated with increased posttraumatic stress at 
follow-up. Conversely, a prospective study of police officers found higher 
evaluations of self-worth pre-trauma predicted reduced PTSD  (Yuan et al., 2011). 
This suggests that pre-trauma negative cognitions about oneself being inadequate or 
hopeless if faced with a traumatic experience predict greater posttraumatic stress.  
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       Longitudinal and cross-sectional studies have also suggested that negative 
appraisal of a traumatic experience predicts increased risk for developing PTSD 
(Dunmore, Clark, Ehlers, 2001; Ehlers Mayou, & Bryant, 1998; Ehring, Ehlers, & 
Glucksman, 2008; Halligan et al., 2003). Halligan et al. (2003) conducted two 
studies of assault victims, one cross-sectional (n = 81) and the other prospective 
longitudinal (n = 73), and found that negative appraisals of trauma memories 
(memory disorganisation and intrusive memories) predicted severity of PTSD 
symptoms and maintenance of the disorder. Dunmore et al. (2001) study of 57 
assault victims established that negative beliefs about self and world were significant 
predictors of PTSD severity at 4 and 6-9 months after the assault.  
Whilst this research is consistent with a cognitive model of PTSD, it only 
considers catastrophic appraisals anchored to trauma or a negative event 
experienced, thus gives no indication whether trait catastrophic thinking is a 
vulnerability factor in PTSD unrelated to the experience of trauma. In fact, Dekel et 
al. (2013) 17-year longitudinal study of Israeli combat veterans used a generalised 
measure of cognitions (the World Assumption Scale; WAS) to assess three core 
cognitions: benevolence of the world, the meaningfulness of the world (i.e., 
assumptions about control and justice) and self-worth or self-control. They found 
that PTSD symptoms predicted generalised negative cognitions about the self and the 
world, rather than vice versa. This suggests that whilst trauma-specific catastrophic 
thinking might predict PTSD symptoms, this is not the case for generalised negative 
cognition.  These findings imply that generalised catastrophic thinking develops in 
response to PTSD, and is therefore not a vulnerability factor in PTSD development. 
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Biological Model of PTSD 
       An alternative model of PTSD is a biological model, based on Pavlov’s (1927) 
classical conditioning theory. It proposes that PTSD develops from a fear 
conditioning process in which previously neutral stimuli present at the time of 
trauma become associated with intense fear and arousal. These then act as 
conditioned stimuli to elicit ongoing conditioned fear responses. For example, a song 
playing in the background during a traumatic event heard at a later time might 
prompt intense fear as if reliving the trauma, unless the individual learns that the 
music is of no threat. Avoidance of these conditioned stimuli inhibits extinction 
learning and maintains PTSD symptoms (Pitman et al., 2012). In this model, trauma 
memory is over-consolidated due to the release of stress hormones (noradrenaline 
and cortisol) during the traumatic event, leading to intrusive memories (Pitman et al., 
2012).  
       Whilst fear conditioning is thought to be involved in the acquisition of PTSD, 
the biological model emphasises that impaired fear extinction learning is involved in 
its persistence. Fear conditioning alone cannot explain why some people develop 
PTSD and others do not when faced with the same trauma or one of similar severity 
(Orr et al., 2000); nor can it explain why about 50% of individuals with PTSD make 
a complete recovery within 3 months, yet others remain symptomatic for years 
(APA, 2013). Strong evidence has emerged suggesting that impaired fear extinction 
interferes with the gradual reduction in PTSD symptoms (as cited in Pitman et al., 
2012). 
       Shin and Liberzon (2010) reviewed research on the neurocircuitry of anxiety 
disorders and neuroimaging studies of PTSD patients and found: a hyporesponsive 
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ventromedial prefrontal region (thought to regulate amygdala activity and thus fear 
response; for e.g., Bremner et al., 1999); a hyperresponsive amygdala (suggesting an 
increased fear response; for e.g., Chung et al., 2006); abnormal hippocampal 
activation and volumes (perhaps reflecting issues with dissociation, and memory 
coding and retrieval; for e.g., Bossini et al., 2008); and a hyperresponsive dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex (associated with exaggerated fear learning; for e.g., 
Bremner et al., 2005 ). In a fear and extinction paradigm, positron emission 
tomographic imaging indicated that PTSD groups have increased amygdala 
activation during fear acquisition and reduced anterior cingulate functioning during 
extinction compared to controls, thus implicating these brain regions in PTSD 
(Bremner et al., 2005). Using fMRI, Milad et al. (2009) also found that hyperactivity 
in the dorsal anterior singulate and hypoactivity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC) were related to impaired extinction in PTSD. Animal studies demonstrate 
that mechanisms of extinction learning are consistent across species in implicating 
the vmPFC in fear extinction (Milad and Quirk, 2002; Quirk & Mueller, 2008).  
Together these findings suggest that reduced activity in vmPFC reflects impaired 
extinction learning in PTSD, and that activation of the prefrontal cortex is required to 
extinguish fear.   
       Differential fear conditioning and extinction paradigm. The classical fear 
conditioning and extinction paradigm has been used extensively to investigate 
emotional learning and memory implicated in the development, symptomology and 
maintenance of anxiety disorders including PTSD, (Graham & Milad, 2011; Guthrie 
& Bryant, 2006; Sijbrandij, Engelhard, Lommen, Leer, & Baas, 2013). The 
acquisition or conditioning phase of the paradigm involves an aversive 
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unconditioned stimulus (US) such as a mild electric shock being repeatedly paired 
with an originally neutral stimulus (CS+) so that it evokes a subsequent conditioned 
fear response when presented alone. The extinction phase involves the CS+ and CS- 
being randomly presented without the US. Another neutral stimulus (CS-) is 
randomly presented during each phase, but never paired with the US. This allows the 
differential responses to the CS+ and CS- in each phase to be clearly observed (see 
Figure 1). Skin conductance response (SCR) or fear potentiated startle are typically 
monitored as measures of fear learning, and threat expectancy ratings are recorded 
prior to each trial (Lovibond et al., 2009). It is expected that individuals with anxiety 
disorders or PTSD would be faster fear conditioning to the CS+, but slower to 
extinguish that fear. 
 
                  
Figure 1. Expected SCR for the CS+ and CS- in the Habituation, Acquisition, and 
Extinction Phases of the Fear Conditioning and Extinction Paradigm. 
 
Fear Acquisition and Extinction in PTSD 
       Whilst some studies report increased fear conditioning in PTSD (reflected by 
increased SCR to the CS+ during the acquisition phase), not all have.  The more 
robust finding is that fear extinction is impaired in PTSD, indexed by higher SCR 
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during the extinction phase. PTSD research using the differential fear-extinction 
paradigm has suggested that dysfunctional fear learning and extinction is: a 
vulnerability factor in the development of posttraumatic stress pre-trauma (Guthrie & 
Bryant, 2006; Lommen et al., 2013); a feature of the disorder (Peri, Ben-Shakhar, 
Shalev, 1997; Blechert, Michael, Vriends, Margraf, & Wilhelm, 2007); and, a 
maintaining factor in PTSD (Milad et al., 2008; Sijbrandij et al., 2013; Orr et al., 
2000; Peri, Ben-Shakhar, Orr, & Shalev, 2000). Relative to controls, PTSD groups 
were found to have higher skin conductance responses following the acquisition of 
fear conditioning (Orr et al., 2000) and reduced fear extinction (Peri et al., 2000).  
       Longitudinal and prospective studies have identified reduced fear extinction as a 
key factor in the development, severity and maintenance of PTSD symptoms. A 
study of 249 Dutch soldiers deployed to Afghanistan for 4 months (Lommen et al., 
2013) found that reduced fear extinction prior to deployment (pre-trauma) was found 
to predict PTSD symptom severity on return (post-trauma), even after controlling for 
pre-trauma symptoms and risk factors. A longitudinal study of 144 of the same 
trauma–exposed soldiers found that impaired fear inhibition also predicted the 
maintenance of PTSD symptoms (Sijbrandij et al., 2013). Similar results were found 
in a study of 70 firefighters assessed during cadet training – pre-trauma reduced 
extinction predicted 31% of the variance in posttraumatic severity when assessed 
within 24 months of becoming active firefighters (post-trauma; Guthrie & Bryant, 
2006).  
       Strong empirical evidence suggesting extinction learning is a predictive and 
maintaining factor in PTSD informs treatment methods that facilitate extinction 
learning. Exposure therapy mirrors this process by repeatedly exposing the 
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individual to the feared stimulus (though often with a graded approach), so that the 
individual learns that there is no aversive consequence thus reducing their fear 
response (Graham & Milad, 2011). Exposure therapy has proven effective in the 
treatment for anxiety disorders, including PTSD (Felmingham et al., 2007; 
Hofmann & Smits, 2008).  
Cognitive Factors, Fear Conditioning and Extinction, and PTSD 
       Fear conditioning has traditionally been seen as a low-level bottom-up reflexive 
or biological process independent of awareness, but recently debate has arisen 
suggesting that it also depends on high-level top-down conscious cognitive processes 
(Chater, 2008; Lovibond et al., 2009; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Mitchell, De 
Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). Lovibond and Shanks (2002) suggest that threat 
expectancy ratings in the fear conditioning and extinction paradigm may themselves 
reflect both unconscious biological and conscious cognitive processes. Lovibond and 
Shanks (2002) research review identified typical congruence between measures of 
threat expectancy, skin conductance or fear potentiated startle, and conscious 
awareness of the contingency presented in the fear-extinction paradigm, suggesting 
all three measures result from the same learning mechanism. Purkis and Lip (2001) 
used all 3 measures in a differential conditioning paradigm and found that there was 
no evidence of conditioned learning in the absence of cognitive contingency 
awareness (as assessed using an expectancy dial), confirming that these factors are 
important in extinguishing fear. Just as heightened threat expectancy is thought to 
characterise PTSD (Kimble, Batterink, Marks, Ross, & Fleming, 2012), catastrophic 
thinking, hypervigilance and exaggerated strartle responses are criteria used for 
PTSD diagnosis (APA, 2013), thus individuals with PTSD may demonstrate 
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heightened levels of each leading into each phase of the differential fear conditioning 
and extinction paradigm.  
       Whilst cogent biological and cognitive models of PTSD have been developed, 
and there is evidence supporting both models, very few studies have examined how 
cognitive and biological models may intersect. Recent research has revealed that 
cognitive factors can influence fear conditioning and extinction. Gazendam and 
Kindt’s (2012) study of the effect of worrying on fear conditioning found that after 
initial fear acquisition, individuals randomly allocated to a “worry” condition 
displayed enhanced fear responses and impaired extinction compared to controls. In 
Lovibond, Mitchell, Minard, Brady, and Menzies’ (2009) study participants in one 
group were given the opportunity to make an avoidance response in the extinction 
phase; they found that those who did so maintained higher shock expectancy ratings 
and strong SCRs compared to controls. Both studies suggest that a cognitive 
mechanism may account for conditioned responding and the failure to extinguish 
fear.       
The Present Study 
       Given the evidence for both biological and cognitive models of PTSD, the lack 
of research integrating them, and the increasing debate regarding the role of 
cognitive processes in fear conditioning and extinction, the current study aims to use 
the differential classical conditioning paradigm to examine the influence of 
catastrophic thinking on fear conditioning and extinction in PTSD, as measured by 
threat expectancy. It is hypothesised that:  
1. PTSD participants will have greater catastrophic thinking than the TEC and 
NTEC groups. 
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2. PTSD participants will display impaired fear extinction learning compared to 
the TEC and NTEC groups, as indicated by greater threat expectancy ratings 
in fear extinction. 
3. Catastrophic thinking mediates the relationship between PTSD symptoms and 
fear extinction, as measured by threat expectancy in the early extinction 
phase. 
Method 
Participants 
       The sample comprised 59 participants (37 women, 22 men) aged between 17 
and 63 (M = 27.66 years, SD = 12.96 years). Six individuals were excluded from the 
study as they did not complete the differential fear-extinction paradigm.  Other 
exclusion criteria included: a history of substance dependence (or an AUDIT score 
of at least 16; Hays, Merz, & Nicholas, 1995; see Appendix A5), previous PTSD, 
neurological disorders or stroke, or traumatic brain injury; current psychosis or 
suicidal ideation; and, being medically unwell. Participants were recruited from first 
year psychology students who receive course credit for their participation. Others 
were recruited from the community via email advertising and received $50 for their 
time. Participants were categorised into three groups according to whether they were 
exposed to a Criterion A trauma (APA, 2000) using the Trauma Exposure 
Questionnaire (TEQ; Vrana & Lauterbach, 1994; see Appendix A1), and whether 
they had gone on to develop PTSD using to the PTSD Checklist – Civilian Version 
(PCL-C; Foa, Cashman, Jaycox, & Perry, 1997; see Appendix A2). To maximise 
sample sizes, subclinical PTSD participants with scores of at least 40 on the PCL-C  
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were included in the PTSD group. According to the National Centre for PTSD 
(2014), these participants met the PTSD cut-off score of 30 for a non-clinical 
setting; the cut-off is 50 in clinical settings. 
• Group 1: Non-trauma exposed control (NTEC) were 19 participants (13 
women, 6 men; age M = 22.84 years, SD = 2.78). 
• Group 2: Trauma-exposed controls who did not develop PTSD (TEC group) 
were 19 participants (12 women, 7 men; age M = 25.05 years, SD = 2.78).  
• Group 3: Trauma-exposed controls who did develop PTSD (PTSD group 
according to our classification above) were 21 participants (12 women, 9 
men; age M = 34.38 years, SD = 2.64).  
Design 
       The study assessed group differences using a between-groups univariate design 
for each of the demographic, clinical, and catastrophic cognition measures. A 3 
(Group: NTE, TE, PTSD) x 2 (Stimuli: CS+, CS-) x 5 (Trial: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) mixed 
factorial design was applied for threat expectancy ratings in the acquisition, early 
extinction, and late extinction phases in the fear conditioning and extinction task. 
The same design was applied in the habituation phase, only with 4 rather than 5 
trials. 
       A mediation analysis was used to assess whether catastrophic thinking mediates 
the relationship between level of posttraumatic stress symptoms and threat 
expectancy during fear extinction. 
Materials 
Traumatic Events Questionnaire (TEQ; Vrana & Lauterbach, 1994; see 
Appendix A1). This is an 11-item questionnaire that assesses Criterion A (APA, 
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2000) trauma exposure, such as interpersonal assault, life-threatening accident, 
natural disasters, or combat experience. Questions are dichotomous (yes/no) in 
nature (for e.g., “Have you ever witnessed someone being badly injured or killed?”). 
The TEQ is a brief screener that identifies lifetime exposure to a traumatic event.  
       PTSD CheckList – Civilian Version (PCL-C; Weathers, Huska, & Keane, 
1991; see Appendix A2).  This is a 17-item standardised self-report measure rating 
PTSD symptomatology (based on DSM-IV-TR criteria; APA, 2000) over the last 
month. It uses a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“not at all”) to 5 (“extremely”). 
The PCL-C provides an ordinal scale of PTSD symptom severity, allowing for PTSD 
diagnosis and has demonstrated good reliability and internal consistency (Foa et al., 
1997); Cronbach’s alpha is .92.  
       Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale – 21 (DASS-21; Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995; see Appendix A3). This is a 21-item self-report measure of 
distress in the past week in relation to three subscales: depression (for e.g., “I felt that 
I had nothing to look forward to”), anxiety (for e.g., “I was aware of dryness in my 
mouth”), and stress (for e.g., “I found it difficult to relax”). It uses a 4-point Likert 
scale ranging from 0 (“did not apply to me at all”) to 3 (“applied to me very much, or 
most of the time”). Total subscale scores are doubled and higher scores reflect 
greater subscale severity (scores above 21, 15 and 26 for depression, anxiety and 
stress subscales respectively are considered severe). The DASS-21 is a well-
validated measure that has demonstrated good reliability and internal consistency 
(Henry & Crawford, 2005). Cronbach’s alpha for each subscale is .91, .84, and .90 
(Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), respectively.     
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      Medical questionnaire (see Appendix A4). This questionnaire is used to collect 
demographic information, and to screen for factors that might give rise to risk or 
need to exclude individuals from the study (for e.g., medical history, medication or 
substance use). This screener was formulated for use in other studies using the same 
participants, thus not all responses applied to this study. 
The Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT; World Health 
Organisation, 2001; see Appendix A5). The AUDIT is a 10-item self-report 
questionnaire designed to screen for potentially harmful alcohol consumption 
patterns. The AUDIT uses a 5-point Likert scale to measure the frequency of 
drinking or problems with drinking. A score of 16 or more is considered to be predict 
high-risk or harmful drinking. The AUDIT is a well-validated measure that has 
demonstrated good reliability and internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .83; Hays et 
al., 1995). 
       Differential fear conditioning and extinction task. This paradigm was run on 
a laptop computer using Inquisit 3.0.6.0 (2011) software, and threat expectancy data 
was collected as part of this task. A Powerlab 16/35 Recording Bare Electrode 
(MLADDB30) attached to the first dorsal interosseous muscle of the dominant hand 
generated a 500 millisecond mild electrical shock (the unconditioned stimulus; US) 
from PowerLAb 16/35 Stimulus Isolator (FE180). 
       Catastrophic Cognitions Questionnaire – Modified (CCQ-M; Khawaja, Oei, 
& Baglioni, 1994; see Appendix A6). This questionnaire is a 21-item self-report 
trait measure of negative appraisals in relation to various experiences. Its 3 subscales 
relate to different types of catastrophic cognitions: emotional (extent to which danger 
is related to emotional responses, for e.g., “being agitated”), physical (extent to 
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which physical hazards are interpreted as dangerous, for e.g., “being injured”), and 
mental (extent to which social anxieties are interpreted as dangerous, for e.g., 
“unable to think rationally”). It uses a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all 
dangerous) to 5 (extremely dangerous) to rate the participant’s sense of danger. 
Scoring involves totalling the scores for each subscale and the total score gives a trait 
measure of catastrophic thinking. The subscales showed high internal consistency 
and good test-retest reliability. Cronbach’s alpha for the emotional, physical and 
mental subscales was .83, .85, and .89 respectively (Khawaja et al., 1994). 
       The Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI; Foa et al., 1999; see 
Appendix A7). This is a 36-item self-report measure of negative appraisals in 
relation to a traumatic experience (those who had not experienced trauma were asked 
to relate the items to the most stressful experience they could recall). The PTCI uses 
a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“totally disagree”) to 7 (“totally agree”). The 
total score is a sum of all scores and the subscale scores are the sum of the relevant 
scores divided by the number of items; scoring involves exclusion of 3 items. The 3 
subscales are Negative Cognitions about Self (about one’s capabilities and response 
to a negative event), Negative Cognitions the World (about world safety in response 
to a negative event), and Self Blame (for the harm caused by a negative event). All 
subscales showed excellent internal consistency and good test-retest reliability and 
Cronbach’s alpha for each was .97, .88, and .89 respectively; along with .97 for the 
scale total score (Foa et al. 1999).  
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Procedure 
              Ethics approval was obtained from the University of Tasmania’s Social 
Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix B). Study information 
was provided and informed consent was obtained for the study (see Appendix C). 
Medical, AUDIT, DASS, TEQ and PCL-C questionnaires were completed. 
Participants were then classified into PTSD, TEC or NTEC groups according to their 
TEQ and PCL-C results. The measures of catastrophic thinking (CCQ-M and PTCI) 
were administered after the differential fear conditioning and extinction paradigm. 
See Appendix A for questionnaires used. Some additional questionnaires were 
administered for other studies using the same participants.  
       In preparation for the fear conditioning and extinction paradigm, participants 
were asked to select a level of the US that they found “uncomfortable, but not 
painful”.  The electrical shock was administered to the 2nd and 3rd fingers of their 
non-dominant hand starting at 2mA and increased incrementally by .5mA until 
discomfort was reported.  
       The fear conditioning and extinction paradigm was then presented on a computer 
screen (see Figure 2) and comprised habituation, acquisition, early extinction and 
late extinction phases. The initial habituation phase involved 4 trials of each of the 
conditioned stimuli (CS): either a red or blue circle. The acquisition phase that 
followed involved each CS (CS+ or CS-) being presented 5 times, with the US 
administered immediately after each CS+ presentation (100% reinforcement 
schedule). Finally, in the extinction phases (early and late extinction) the CS+ and 
CS- were both presented 5 times without the US. The CS+ and CS- colours were 
varied from red to blue in a randomised, counterbalanced order between participants 
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and groups. CS presentation was random, with the constraint that no CS occurred 
more that twice in succession. See Figure 1. Participants were told that they may 
experience a shock following the habituation stage. Each CS appeared in the centre 
of a white computer screen for 12 seconds, with an inter-trial interval of 12-
21seconds. A saliva sample was taken between the early and late extinction phases 
for use in another study. Participants were required to rate threat expectancy on an 
11-point Likert scale ranging from -5 (certain no shock), 0 (uncertain), to 5 (certain 
shock) displayed on the screen with each trial. 
 
 
Figure 2. Trials presented within Each Phase of the Differential Fear Conditioning-
Extinction Paradigm. 
 
Analysis 
       The study assessed group differences for demographic and clinical measures 
using between-groups univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA), and 3 x 2 Chi 
Square test of independence for gender distribution. The Welch statistic was applied 
when the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not met. To assess whether the 
PTSD group had greater catastrophic cognitions, separate between-groups univariate 
ANOVA were conducted using the total and subscale scores of two catastrophic 
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cognition measures, the PTCI and CCQ-M. Sidak-adjusted post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons were used to examine differences between groups. 
       To assess whether the PTSD group displayed impaired fear extinction learning, 
threat expectancy measures were analysed using mixed factorial ANOVA and Sidak-
adjusted post-hoc pairwise comparisons were employed where significant main 
effects and interactions were found. A 3 (Group: PTSD, trauma-exposed, no trauma) 
x 2 (Stimuli: CS+, CS-) x 4 (Trial: 1, 2, 3, 4) ANOVA was used for the habituation 
phase and a 3 (Group: PTSD, trauma-exposed, no trauma) x 2 (Stimuli: CS+, CS-) x 5 
(Trial: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) ANOVA was applied to the acquisition, early extinction and late 
extinction phases. Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were made when the assumption 
of sphericity was violated. 
       To assess whether catastrophic thinking mediated the relationship between 
PTSD symptoms and threat expectancy in extinction learning, a simple mediation 
analysis was conducted using Hayes’ Process macro version 2.12.1 in SPSS Version 
21 (Hayes, 2013). The simple mediation analysis (see Figures 3 & 4) assesses 
whether X [predictor variable: PTSD symptom severity (PCL total score)] affects Y 
[outcome variable: average threat expectancy ratings during extinction (EEAv)] 
indirectly through M [mediator variable Catastrophic Cognitions (PTCI total)] 
according to the following criteria being satisfied (Baron & Kenny, 1986):  
1. X significantly predicts Y in the unmediated total effect model (see Figure 3). 
This model estimates Y = i1 + cX + e1 (regression coefficient c represents the 
total effect of X on Y, i1 is the intercept, and e1 is the residual). 
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2. X significantly predicts M in the simple mediation model (see Figure 4). This 
model estimates M = i2 +aX + e2 (regression coefficient a represents the 
relation of X on M, i2 is the intercept, and e2 is the residual). 
3. M significantly predicts Y controlling for M (see Figure 4). This model 
estimates Y = i3 + c’X +bM + e3 (regression coefficient c’ represents the 
direct effect of X to Y adjusted for M, and b is the effect of M to Y adjusted 
for X; i3 is the intercept, and e3 is the residual).  
4. Baron and Kenny (1986) also specify that Y should not cause M and M 
should be free from errors in measurement. 
       Bootstrapping was used for the indirect mediation effects to reduce sample 
skewness and kurtosis common in smaller samples. It involves extensive resampling 
from the data and allows 95% confidence intervals and a measure of standard error to 
be calculated. Mediation is said to occur if all criteria have been satisfied and the 
indirect effect of ab (where c = c’ + ab) is found to be significant as the 
bootstrapped 95% confidence interval does not include zero (Fritz & MacKinnon, 
2007).   
      
              
Figure 3.  Total Effect Model of X on Y.  
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Figure 4. Simple Mediation Model.  
 
 
Results 
Data Preparation and Screening 
      There were no missing values among study completers for any measure tested. 
One extreme univariate outlier was observed in PTCI Self-blame and was replaced 
with a value equal to 3 standard deviations from the mean (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2001).  Data was screened for skewness and kurtosis. A significant departure from 
normality was identified using the Shapiro-Wilks test for PTCI Self in the NTC and 
TEC groups, and for the PCL and all DASS subscales (all positively skewed 
distributions). Logarithmic transformations were conducted for all but the DASS and 
PCL (which are prone to positive skew due to the incidence of psychopathology 
within the population), however transformations did not affect the pattern of results 
or the conclusions.  
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Demographic and Clinical Measures 
       Table 1 displays the mean and standard deviation for clinical and descriptive 
data collected for each group (PTSD, TEC and NTEC). It includes results from 
univariate ANOVAs comparing the mean scores between groups on age, the PCL-C. 
and the subscales of the DASS, and from a 3 x 2 Chi Square test of independence for 
gender differences across groups. Significant group differences were found for all 
variables other than gender. According to Levene’s test, the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was not met for Age (F(2.56) = 5.25, p=.008), nor for the 
depression subscale of the DASS (F(2.56) = 6.11, p=.004), thus the Welch statistic 
was substituted in both cases.  
       Sidak-adjusted post-hoc pairwise comparisons (see Appendix D1) indicated a 
significant difference between the PTSD group and both the NTEC and TEC groups 
on the PCL-C (reflecting greater PTSD symptomology) and the DASS subscales, 
however there was no significant difference between the NTEC and TEC groups.  
Post-hoc comparisons of Age indicated that the PTSD group was significantly older 
that the NTEC and trending towards being significantly older than the TEC group. 
Although these results reflected the fact that older participants are more likely to 
have experienced trauma in their lifetime, further analyses controlled for Age as a 
covariate using repeated measures ANCOVA. High ratings on DASS depression are 
assumed in PTSD due to high comorbidity of disorders, thus further analyses will not 
control for DASS depression. According to the APA (2013), approximately 80% of 
people with PTSD have at least one comorbid psychiatric disorder, most commonly 
depression.  
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Table 1 
Demographic and Clinical Measures Including Group Means (Standard Deviations), 
Test Statistics, Significance Levels, and Effect Sizes  
 
Variable     PTSD       TEC     NTEC         Test Statistic         p           ɳp2 
Age            34.38 (15.26) 25.05 (9.81)      22.84 (10.08)      F = 4.11       .024*        .16 
PCL-C            51.71 (11.77) 24.84 (4.62) 20.47 (3.70) F = 95.43    <.001**      .77 
DASS   
- Depression    8.52 (5.58) 2.89 (3.75)   1.84 (3.20) F = 11.06    <.001**      .33 
- Anxiety   8.05 (3.51) 2.10 (2.08)   1.78 (2.22) F = 34.11    <.001**      .55   
- Stress       12.14 (4.60)   5.21 (2.8)   3.63 (4.03) F = 27.15    <.001**      .49 
Gender      12 F, 9 M   12 F, 7 M    13 F, 6 M χ 2 = .54         .761  
 
Measures of Catastrophic Thinking 
       Table 2 displays the means, standard deviations and results from univariate 
ANOVAs comparing the means from each of the groups (PTSD, TEC and NTEC) 
for measures of catastrophic thinking and their subscales. No significant group 
differences were found for the Total CCQ-M, the CCQ-M subscales, or the PTCI 
Self-blame subscale. Significant group differences were found for the Total PTCI 
and its subscales PTCI World and PTCI Self.      
        Sidak-adjusted post-hoc pairwise comparisons (see Appendix D2) revealed a 
significant difference between the PTSD group and both the NTEC and TEC groups 
on the PTCI Total and PTCI Self subscale, but there was no significant difference 
between the NTEC and TEC groups. Posthoc comparisons identified that the PTSD 
and TEC groups had significantly higher PTCI world scores than the NTEC group, 
*p < .05. **p < .01. Note. ɳp2 = Effect size; Degrees of Freedom = 2; PCL-C = PTSD Check List 
Civilian Version; DASS = Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales 
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and the PTSD group was trending towards having higher PTCI World scores than the 
TC group. 
 
Table 2 
Measures of Catastrophic Thinking Including Group Means (Standard Deviations), 
Test Statistics, Significance Levels, and Effect Sizes  
 
Variable         PTSD         TEC          NTEC          F           p           ɳp2 
CCQ Total      60.33 (11.39)     55.21 (8.88)       57.58 (12.97)    1.05        .358       .04 
CCQ Mental       20.05 (5.11)      18.36 (4.98)       19.95 (6.59)        .55        .580       .02 
CCQ Emotional      15.05 (4.13)       12.89 (3.49)      12.79 (4.28)       1.85       .167       .06 
CCQ Physical       24.90 (4.49)       23.95 (3.95)      24.84 (4.63)         .29       .749       .01 
PTCI Total      109.57 (35.34)    78.05 (28.27)    68.10 (30.66)     9.43     <.001**    .25 
PTCI Self          2.97 (1.15)        2.01 (1.00)        1.82 (.94)         7.19       .002**    .20   
PTCI World          4.52 (1.49)        3.54 (1.30)       2.45 (1.02)      12.79     <.001**    .31 
PTCI Self-Blame       3.09 (1.53)        2.19 (1.06)        2.55 (1.47)       2.14        .128       .07 
 
Threat Expectancy in Fear Conditioning and Extinction 
       Habituation. A 3x2x4 repeated measures ANOVA in the habituation phase 
found no significant main group effect [F(2, 56) =.97, p =.384, ɳp2 =.03]; a 
significant condition main effect [F(1, 56) =5.92, p=.018, ɳp2 =.10] which revealed 
that whilst participants did not expect a shock for both conditions (signified by 
negative values), there was less threat expectancy for the CS- (M = -2.1, SD=.34) 
than for the CS+ (M=-1.8, SD = .35); and a significant trial main effect [F(1.77, 
98.91) =4.32, p =.020, ɳp2 =.07], following a Greenhouse-Geisser correction. See 
Figure 5.  
 
*p < .05. **p < .01. Note. ɳp2 = Effect size; Degrees of Freedom = 2; CCQ = Catastrophic 
Cognitions Questionnaire-Modified; PTCI = Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory 
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Figure 5. Threat Expectancy Ratings at Each Trial for each CS and Group in the 
Habituation Phase. 
 
       Sidak-adjusted post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that only the threat 
expectancy between trial 4 and trial 5 reduced significantly (see Appendix D3). A 
trend was identified for the condition by group interaction [F(2, 56) =2.74 p =.073, 
ɳp2 =.09] and post-hoc tests revealed this reduced threat expectancy to the CS+ was 
present in the TEC group, but not NTEC group. The condition by trial interaction 
was non-significant following a Greenhouse-Geisser correction [F(2.00, 112.20) 
=7.69, p =.190, ɳp2 =.03]. The trial by group interaction [F(6, 168) =.79, p =.577, ɳp2 
=.03] and condition by trial by group [F(6, 168) =.40, p =.880, ɳp2 =.01] interactions 
were also non-significant. Taking Age as a covariate removed all effects previously 
found. 
       Acquisition. A 3x2x5 repeated measures ANOVA in the acquisition phase 
found no significant main effect of group [F(2, 56) =.07, p =.935, ɳp2 <.01], or of 
trial [F(4, 224) =1.85, p =.120, ɳp2 =.01], but there was a main effect of condition 
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[F(1, 56) =175.07, p <.001, ɳp2 =.76]. This indicates that threat expectancy ratings 
for the CS+ were significantly greater than for the CS- overall. See Figure 7.  The 
condition main effect revealed that threat expectancy ratings were significantly 
greater for the CS+ (M =2.905, SE =.22) than the CS- (M =-2.854, SE =.26). The 
main effect was superseded by a significant condition by trial interaction [F(3.32, 
185.74) =56.56, p =<.001, ɳp2 =.51], following a Greenhouse-Geisser correction. 
Figure 6 reveals that the difference between threat expectancy ratings for the CS+ and 
the CS- increased across trials.  Sidak-adjusted post-hoc pairwise comparisons 
revealed that there were significant condition effects at each trial, but the difference 
between the CS+ and the CS- was smaller at trial 1 than at later trials (see Figure 7 & 
Appendix D4). The condition by group [F(2, 56) =.23, p =.794, ɳp2 =.01], trial by 
group [F(8, 224) =.60, p =.775, ɳp2 =.02], and condition by trial by group [F(8, 224) 
=1.54, p =.144, ɳp2 =.05] interactions were non-significant. Taking Age as a 
covariate did not alter the pattern of findings. 
 
 
Figure 6. Threat Expectancy Ratings at each Trial for CS+ and CS- during the 
Acquisition Phase. 
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       Early Extinction. A 3x2x5 repeated measures ANOVA in the early extinction 
phase revealed a significant main effect of group [F(2, 56) =5.44, p =.007, ɳp2 =.16]. 
See Figure 8. Sidak-adjusted post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that the PTSD 
group [M =.005, SE =.35) had significantly greater threat expectancy ratings than the 
TEC group [M =-1.474, SE =.36, p =.015, 95% CI (.24, 2.72)] and the NTEC group 
[M =-1.368, SE =.36, p =.026, 95% CI (.13, 2.61)]. The TEC and NTEC groups did 
not differ significantly [p =.996, 95% CI (-1.38, 1.17)], and both did not expect threat 
in the early extinction phase (see Figures  7 & 8). 
      
 
Figure 8. Mean Threat Expectancy Ratings for the PTSD, TEC and NTEC Groups 
during the Early Extinction Phase. 
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       There was also a significant condition main effect [F(1, 56) =29.78, p=<.001, 
ɳp2 =.35] which revealed that there was significantly less threat expectancy with the 
CS- than the CS+.  Furthermore, there was a significant trial main effect [F(2.25, 
126.01) =49.04, p =<.001, ɳp2 =.47], following a Greenhouse-Geisser correction (see 
Figures 7 & 9). Sidak-adjusted post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that threat 
expectancy reduced over time across trials, and with the exception of trial 1 to trial 2, 
the differences between successive trials were significant (see Appendix D3). The 
main effect was superseded by a significant condition by trial interaction [F(4, 224) 
=5.01, p =.001, ɳp2 =.08]. See Figure 9. Sidak-adjusted post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons revealed that there were significant condition effects at each trial (see 
Appendix D4). When broken down by trial, it was revealed that fear extinction 
occurred more rapidly for the CS+ than the CS-, as the differences between all trials 
except 4 and 5 were significant for the CS+, but only the difference between trials 2 
and 3 was significant for the CS- (see Appendix D5).  
 
 
Figure 9. Condition by Trial Threat Expectancy Ratings during the Early Extinction 
Phase. 
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       A marginal trend was identified for the trial by group interaction [F(8, 224) 
=1.78, p =.082, ɳp2 =.06], but the condition by group [F(2, 56) =.37, p =.692, ɳp2 
=.01], and condition by trial by group [F(8, 224) =.76, p =.634, ɳp2 =.03] interactions 
were non-significant. Taking Age as a covariate did not alter the pattern of findings. 
       Late Extinction. A 3x2x5 repeated measures ANOVA in the late extinction 
phase found a significant main effect of group [F(2, 56) =6.39, p =.003, ɳp2 =.19]. 
See Figures 7 and 10. Sidak-adjusted post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that 
the PTSD group [M =-.738, SE =.46) had significantly greater threat expectancy 
ratings than the TEC group [M =-2.700, SE =.48, p =.014, 95% CI (.32,3.60)] and the 
NTEC group [M =-2.863, SE =.48, p =.007, 95% CI (.48, 3.77)]. The TEC and 
NTEC groups did not differ significantly [p =.993, 95% CI (-1.52, 1.84)].                                        
 
Figure 10. Mean Threat Expectancy Ratings for the PTSD, TEC and NTEC Groups 
during the Late Extinction Phase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
       There was also a significant condition main effect [F(1, 56) =10.31, p=.002, ɳp2 
=.15] which revealed significantly less threat expectancy with CS- than CS+. Finally, 
there was a significant trial main effect [F(1.846, 103.37) =36.28, p =<.001, ɳp2 
=.39], following a Greenhouse-Geisser correction. Sidak-adjusted post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons revealed that threat expectancy reduced over time across trials, and the 
differences between successive trials were significant (See Appendix D3) with the 
exception of trial 4 to trial 5. A trend was identified for the condition by trial by 
group interaction [F(8, 224) =1.81, p =.076, ɳp2 =.06], but there was no significant 
condition by trial interaction following a Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
[F(2.64,147.73) =.55, p =.623, ɳp2 =.01]. The condition by group [F(2, 56) =.60, p 
=.551, ɳp2 =.02], and trial by group [F(8, 224) =1.14, p =.335, ɳp2 =.04] interactions 
were also non-significant. Taking Age as a covariate removed previous effects, 
except that of a significant main trial effect. 
Mediation Analysis 
       Compared to the TEC and NTEC groups, the PTSD group was found to display 
significantly greater threat expectancy in early extinction and significantly higher 
levels of trauma-related catastrophic thinking on the total PTCI, but not significantly 
greater generalised catastrophic thinking on the CCQ-M. The simple mediation 
analysis (see Figure 12) was therefore performed using total PTCI as the mediator 
variable (M), PCL-C scores as the predictor variable (X), and a measure of average 
threat expectancy across trials for the CS+ and CS- for the early extinction phase 
(EEav) as the outcome variable (Y).  
        Prior to mediation analysis, the c and a pathways were tested for significance 
(see Figures 11 and 12). An increase in the PCL-C (X) was found to significantly 
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predict an increase in the EEav variable (Y; see Figure 11). An increase in the PCL-C 
(X) was found to significantly predict an increase in the total PTCI (M), as indicated 
by pathway a in Figure 12 (see Table 3).  
 
 
                  
Figure 11.  Total Significant Effect Model of PCL-C on EEav.  
 
 
        
 
Figure 12. Simple Mediation Model for the Mediation Analysis of PTCI on the 
Direct Relationship Between PCL-C and EEav scores (*p < .05, **p < .01). 
 
 
       The simple mediation model for the mediation analysis of PTCI on the direct 
relationship between PCL-C and EEav scores (see Figure 12) indicated a significant 
direct effect (c’ pathway) of the PCL-C on the EEav variable, and a non-significant 
effect of total PTCI on the EEav variable (b pathway) as set out in Table 3. The 
indirect effect of PCL-C on EEav through total PTCI was non-significant as 
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bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals included zero (see Figure 12). Taking Age as 
a covariate reduced the significant direct effect (c’ pathway) of the PCL-C on the 
EEav variable to trend level (p =.051). 
 
Table 3  
Model Coefficients for the Mediation Study of PTCI on the Direct Relationship 
Between PCL-C and EEav Scores  
 
       Consequent 
    M (PTCI)          Y (EEAv) 
Antecedent         Coefficient      SE          p            Coefficient       SE           p  
 
 
X(PCL-C) a 1.365     .235     <.001** c’ .043     .016       .011* 
M (PTCI) -      -             -               -  b .001     .007       .906 
Constant i1 41.011   8.616     <.001** i2        -2.407     .560     <.001** 
 
                  R2 = .372,     R2 = .173,  
            F(1, 57) = 33.733,  p < .001**                  F(2,56) = 5.849, p = .005** 
 
Discussion 
       This study examined catastrophic thinking and threat expectancy in fear 
extinction in PTSD compared to controls, and addressed the question of whether 
catastrophic thinking may mediate the relationship between PTSD symptom severity 
and heightened threat expectancy in fear extinction. PTSD participants were found to 
have significantly greater catastrophic thinking than controls relating to their 
traumatic experiences (indexed by the PTCI score), but did not report differences in 
more generalised catastrophic thinking (total CCQ score). PTSD participants also 
*p < .05. **p < .01. Note. PCL-C = PTSD Check List Civilian Version; PTCI = Posttraumatic 
Cognitions Inventory; EEAv = Measure of Average Threat Expectancy ratings for the CS+ and 
CS- across trials of the Early Extinction Phase. 
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displayed significantly greater threat expectancy during fear extinction compared to 
controls, suggesting impaired fear extinction learning. Catastrophic thinking (as 
measured by the PTCI total score) was not found to mediate the relationship between 
PTSD symptoms (as measured by PCL-C scores) and fear extinction (as measured by 
threat expectancy ratings across the early extinction phase). These findings suggest 
that although impaired fear extinction and catastrophic cognitions of trauma are both 
associated with PTSD, catastrophic cognitions do not explain the relationship 
between PTSD symptoms and both heightened threat expectancy and impaired fear 
extinction learning.  This study raises questions regarding some aspects of the 
cognitive model and highlights the need for the development of more integrative 
biological and cognitive models of PTSD.  
Catastrophic Thinking in PTSD 
       The first hypothesis that PTSD participants will have greater catastrophic 
thinking than controls was partially confirmed; significant differences were found for 
the PTSD group relative to controls on the trauma-related PTCI measure (except for 
the Self-blame subscale), but no significant group differences were found for the 
more generalised CCQ-M measure. Together these findings suggest that heightened 
catastrophic thinking in PTSD is specific to trauma experiences rather than a more 
generalized trait and cognitive style. 
       The PTSD group scored significantly higher on the Total PTCI and and Self –
subscale of the PTCI compared to both the NTEC and TEC groups, though there was 
no significant difference between the control groups. This suggests that negative 
appraisals about one’s capabilities and response to trauma are more significant in 
PTSD than controls. Interestingly, both the PTSD and TEC groups scored 
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significantly higher on the World PTCI measures of negative appraisal compared to 
the NTEC group, but not compared to each other. This suggests that catastrophic 
thinking in relation to the world being unsafe or unpredictable is affected by 
exposure to trauma rather than specifically by PTSD diagnostic status. This is 
consistent with findings from Bryant and Guthrie’s (2005) prospective study of fire-
fighters in which pre-trauma catastrophic thinking on only the PTSI Self subscale 
predicted PTSD symptoms, but the World subscale was not found to be a significant 
predictor pre-trauma. Previous research also suggests there is increased trauma-
related catastrophic thinking in PTSD, although a variety of measures have been 
used (Bryant & Guthrie, 2005; Dunmore et al., 2001; Halligan et al., 2003). 
       The Self-blame PTCI measure reflects the extent to which one believes they are 
to blame for the harm caused by the trauma, and group differences on this measure 
were found to be non-significant in the present study. Whist this finding is consistent 
with research finding that the Self-blame measure on the PTCI did not predict PTSD 
symptoms (Beck et al., 2004; Kolts Robinson, & Tracy, 2004), other research has 
suggested self-blame is important in PTSD (Foa et al., 1999; Frazier, Berman, & 
Steward, 2002; Laposa & Alden, 2003). Beck et al. (2004) suggested their non-
significant Self-blame findings might be related to the nature of the trauma their 
participants experienced. Whilst their participants were victims of motor vehicle 
accidents who did not report excessive self-blame, nearly half of the participants in 
Foa et al. (1999) study were victims of assault whose scores on all three PTCI 
subscales were significantly greater than those of accident survivors. Startup, 
Makgekgenene and Webster (2007) found that victims of accidents, disasters and 
life-threatening illnesses produced the highest scores on all subscales of the PTCI, 
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and sexual assault victims reported the highest levels of self-blame. The present 
study used a mixed trauma sample, therefore the non-significant findings on the Self-
blame measure of the PTCI may be due to differences in the type of trauma 
experienced.  
       No significant group differences were found for the CCQ-M, a generalised or 
trait measure of catastrophic thinking based on 3 types of negative appraisals 
(emotional, physical and mental) in relation to various experiences (rather than being 
specifically trauma-related). Previous research has tended to focus on a trauma-
anchored measure only, but Dekel et al. (2013) used a general measure of negative 
cognition and found that increased PTSD symptoms amplified general maladaptive 
appraisals of the self and world over time. As this study was longitudinal and without 
control groups, a direct comparison cannot be made.  
Threat Expectancy in the Fear Conditioning and Extinction Paradigm 
        The second hypothesis predicted that the PTSD group would have impaired fear 
extinction compared to the control groups.  This was expected to be seen by higher 
threat expectancy ratings for the PTSD group in the fear extinction phase compared 
to controls, but no differences were predicted between groups in the fear 
conditioning phase. Differential responses to the CS+ and CS- followed the pattern 
expected in the differential fear conditioning paradigm, in that increased differential 
responses during fear conditioning and decreased differential responses during 
extinction were recorded. Therefore, the differential fear conditioning and extinction 
task resulted in valid fear conditioning and extinction. As hypothesised, the PTSD 
group maintained higher levels of threat expectancy for both the CS+ and CS- 
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throughout the extinction phases. Responses in each phase of the paradigm will be 
discussed in more detail below.        
       Habituation. A significant main effect of trial in the habituation phase revealed 
that threat expectancy reduced across trials. As participants were given instructions 
that they would not receive a shock during this phase, it was not surprising that fear 
reduction followed. There was a surprising condition main effect in the habituation 
phase that revealed that the CS+ had greater threat expectancy than the CS-. This was 
unexpected as the coloured circles for the CS+ and CS- were randomised across 
subjects and counterbalanced across groups. The size of this effect was small, and 
there was a trend for a group by condition effect that may shed some light on this 
main effect. The group by condition trend revealed that this heightened threat 
expectancy was observed in the trauma-exposed and PTSD groups, but not the 
NTEC group – this suggests there was generally greater threat expectancy 
(potentially related to anticipatory anxiety) in the trauma-exposed groups. However, 
the fact that these groups displayed less threat expectancy to the CS+ is considered a 
random chance effect.  It should be noted that all values were negative in this 
analysis, which reveals that threat was not expected on any trial (therefore, 
instructions were valid and this can be considered a valid baseline condition).  
       Acquisition. The significant main effect of condition on threat expectancy had a 
large effect size and indicated that participants were much more likely to expect a 
shock with the CS+ than the CS-. The condition by trial effect was also significant 
with a large effect size, indicating the threat expectancy was significantly larger for 
the CS+ than the CS- at every trial, and that this difference between conditions 
increased across successive trials (see Figure 7). This significant condition by trial 
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interaction confirmed that successful fear conditioning had occurred during the fear 
acquisition phase.  
       Extinction.  As noted above, the second hypothesis that PTSD participants 
would display impaired fear extinction learning compared to controls was confirmed.  
This was seen by the group main effect in the extinction phase. Pairwise posthoc 
comparisons revealed that the PTSD group reported greater threat expectancy ratings 
compared to both controls groups (which did not differ), and this was of a moderate 
effect size. The finding that the PTSD group had impaired fear extinction learning is 
consistent with previous fear conditioning and extinction research, such as Sijbrandij 
et al. (2013) and Norrholm et al. (2011) studies that both reported fear-potentiated 
startle responses and threat expectancy ratings. 
       It is interesting to note that this effect of heightened threat expectancy in PTSD 
was evident to both the CS+ and CS-. This suggests that not only does the PTSD 
group expect threat with the danger signal, but it also has elevated threat 
expectancies in relation to safety signals. A positive value in threat expectancy 
(meaning actively expecting threat) was evidenced until trial 5 in the PTSD group, 
compared with trial 3 for both controls. In late extinction, the control groups 
maintained their sense of safety in relation to CS+, but the PTSD group’s sense of 
threat increased again and was positive until trial 4. 
        Early extinction findings were generally consistent with previous research (for 
e.g., Lommen et al., 2013), but late extinction findings differed somewhat. Typically, 
the late extinction phase or lengthened extinction phase indicates consolidation of 
previous extinction learning (for e.g., Gazendam & Kindt, 2012; Peri et al., 2000), 
however expectancy ratings for the CS+ were raised in the PTSD group again in late 
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extinction, and examination of the graphs revealed a reinstatement of threat 
expectancy in late extinction. These findings may be explained by a methodological 
variation in the current study in which a saliva sample was taken for another research 
project between the early and late extinction phases. This may have resulted in 
increased uncertainty and a consequent elevation of threat expectancy. Interestingly, 
it appears that only the PTSD group responded to this disruption by shifting from a 
sense of safety in response to the CS+ at the end of the early extinction phase (as 
measured by a negative mean threat expectancy at trial 5) to a sense of threat in 
response to the CS+ at the start of late extinction phase (as measured by a positive 
mean threat expectancy at trial 1). 
Does Catastrophic Thinking Mediate the Relationship between PTSD 
Symptoms and Fear Extinction? 
       The third hypothesis predicting that catastrophic thinking mediates the 
relationship between PTSD symptoms and fear extinction (as measured by threat 
expectancy in the early extinction phase) was not supported. In the present study, an 
average measure of threat expectancy for the CS+ and CS- across trials of the early 
extinction phase was used as the outcome variable in the mediation analysis due to a 
significant difference found for the PTSD group compared to controls. The total 
PTCI score was used as the mediator in this analysis as the PTSD group showed 
significantly greater catastrophic thinking according to this measure. Findings 
suggest that whilst there is a strong association between greater PTSD symptoms and 
both impaired extinction and heightened trauma-specific catastrophic thinking, 
difficulties in extinguishing fear are not explained by the heightened catastrophic 
cognition.  
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      Studies analysing whether a cognitive mechanism accounts for the failure to 
extinguish fear are rare, and those involving PTSD have not been conducted to the 
author’s knowledge. Gazendam and Kindt’s (2012) study found that worry enhanced 
fear responses and impaired extinction, and Lovibond et al. (2009) found that 
avoidance responses in the extinction phase led to higher shock expectancy ratings 
being maintained; however, neither considered these variables in relation to PTSD.  
       As this was the first study of its kind, it is difficult to relate the current findings 
to previous research. However, given that it has been suggested that threat 
expectancy reflects both unconscious biological and conscious cognitive processes 
(Lovibond & Shanks, 2002), it could be argued that the fear-conditioning paradigm 
includes both cognitive and biological mechanisms involved in PTSD. Whilst 
catastrophic thinking may not mediate the relationship between PTSD symptoms and 
fear extinction, it is premature to reject the cognitive models of PTSD as other 
cognitive variables such as worry or avoidance may explain this relationship and 
further research is required.   
       Consistent with previous literature, a significant relationship was found between 
PTSD symptoms and both reduced fear extinction (for e.g., Guthrie & Bryant, 2006; 
Sijbrandij et al., 2013) and increased catastrophic thinking (for e.g., Bryant & 
Guthrie, 2005; Dekel, et al., 2013), but interestingly, the relationship between 
catastrophic thinking and reduced fear extinction was not significant. Including the 
non-significant self-blame subscale in the total PTCI measure used in the mediation 
analysis may have affected results, but when the mediation analysis was run again 
with only the self-blame subscale as the mediator variable, the findings were still 
non-significant.  
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Theoretical and Clinical Implications 
       Catastrophic thinking in PTSD. Partially in support of cognitive theory, the 
present study found that catastrophic thinking in the PTSD group was significantly 
greater than controls when trauma-specific, but not when generalised. These findings 
do not support schema theory unless the pre-trauma schemata are trauma-specific 
catastrophic cognitive patterns (Beck et al., 1979; Eysenck, 1992). Foa and 
Rothbaum (1988) build on schema theory by suggesting that if PTSD does not 
develop when trauma activates maladaptive schemata, then it develops when trauma 
violates a rigid belief about the predictability and safety of the world and of one 
being capable; the trauma cannot be interpreted and adaptively integrated as a unique 
experience. The current findings fit better with Foa and Rothbaum’s theory (1988) as 
negative cognitions about the world were only significant in the group in which 
trauma had been experienced (PTSD and TEC groups), thus catastrophic cognitions 
or schemata about the world were not problematic pre-trauma in the PTSD group. As 
Ehlers and Clarke’s (2000) cognitive model anchors catastrophic appraisals in PTSD 
to the traumatic event and its sequelae, the present study supports their theory in this 
respect. The current findings and previous research do implicate trauma-related 
catastrophic thinking in PTSD and perhaps suggest that adopting more evidence-
based appraisals might be helpful in treating or preventing PTSD.  
       Fear Extinction Model of PTSD. The present study supported the biological 
model confirming that fear extinction is impaired in PTSD (Pitman et al., 2012). The 
persistence of heightened threat expectancy responses to the CS+ when no longer 
paired with electric shock implies that there is reduced capacity to extinguish 
aversive conditioned responses in PTSD.  
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       Integrating cognitive and fear extinction models of PTSD. The third 
hypothesis tested a potential mechanism (catastrophic thinking) which may have 
integrated the cognitive and biological models of PTSD.  Although the current study 
did not find that catastrophic thinking mediated the relationship between PTSD 
symptoms and fear extinction, this is the first study assessing this relationship and it 
is premature to reject any model on this basis of this or the potential to integrate 
models.  
       The persistence of PTSD according to Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) cognitive 
model involves an ongoing sense of current threat due to catastrophic cognitions and     
disturbed memory coding, whereas the biological model suggests impaired extinction 
of conditioned fear is involved - both models implicate an ongoing sense of threat, 
and implicit memory and learning processes in the maintenance of PTSD. It is 
therefore reasonable to suggest that the cognitive and fear conditioning models are 
not mutually exclusive. However, further research is required to elucidate how the 
two models intersect. 
Limitations and Future Research 
       Several limitations were identified in the current study. Firstly, the PTCI related 
responses to trauma, but not all participants had been exposed to trauma and NTEC 
participants were asked to fill in the PTCI in relation to a stressful event. Differences 
on this score may therefore have been associated with the relative severity of the 
distressful event to which responses related. Trauma varies in severity and therefore 
level of actual threat, but the relative severity and type of traumatic event was not 
measured in the present study. Future research would benefit from the inclusion of a 
measure of trauma severity, larger samples, and a PTSD group with greater PTSD 
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symptoms, as average PLC-C scores for the PTSD group (M=51.71) were only just 
within clinical guidelines (above 50 for diagnosis).  
       Secondly, as we were assessing the relationship between catastrophic cognitions 
and fear extinction, we selected threat expectancy ratings as a dependent measure as 
this has been linked to cognitive processes involved in fear extinction. However, 
most studies of fear conditioning and extinction utilise threat expectancy ratings in 
conjunction with SCR or startle responses (as indices of cognition and arousal 
respectively; Lovibond et al., 2009).  Whilst some studies find a concordance 
between measures (see Lovibond & Shank, 2002), others do not concur (for e.g., 
Sijbrandj et al., 2013) and therefore further research is required comparing dependent 
measures or fear response. A mediating relationship of catastrophic cognitions 
between PTSD symptoms and fear extinction may be therefore be found if fear is 
measured by SCR, however further research is needed.  
       Thirdly, methodological considerations include the use of a100% reinforcement 
schedule of conditioned stimulus and unconditioned stimulus pairings in the 
acquisition phase, which appeared to cause a ceiling effect in the PTSD group.  This 
has been found in some other previous studies with the same rate of reinforcement 
(for e.g., Bos, Beckers & Kindt, 2012).  We selected a 100% reinforcement rate to 
ensure contingency learning, however, a partial reinforcement schedule in future 
research would likely reduce the chance of ceiling effects and delay acquisition and 
extinction. Such research might also shed light on whether the PTSD group 
maintains their level of threat expectancy even when faced with contradictory 
stimuli, as has been suggested in the past (Eysenck, 1992; Padesky, 1994).     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
       Research would also benefit from a two-day testing paradigm to allow delayed 
recall test of fear extinction learning, as this has been found to be most robustly 
impaired in PTSD (Milad et al., 2008; Milad et al., 2009). This was beyond the scope 
of the present thesis and would require controlling for menstrual phase in women, as 
low levels of estrogen have been shown to specifically impair fear extinction recall 
(Milad, Igoe, Lebron-Milad, & Novales, 2009a; Milad et al., 2010). 
Conclusion 
        The present study addressed the increasing debate about whether fear extinction 
learning is mediated by cognitive processing and applied this for the first time to 
PTSD.  Specifically, this study examined whether catastrophic cognitions mediated 
the relationship between PTSD symptoms and fear extinction. In accordance with 
hypotheses, greater catastrophic cognitions were found in PTSD (although they were 
specific to the trauma experience) and impaired fear extinction (indexed by 
heightened threat expectancy ratings in the fear extinction phase). With findings in 
support of both cognitive and biological theory, the third hypothesis examined 
whether catastrophic thinking mediated the well-established relationship between 
posttraumatic symptoms and impaired fear extinction, but findings did not support 
this hypothesis. Whilst these findings do not support a significant interaction 
between biological and cognitive models in PTSD, further research is required as 
influential models suggest a potential integration of cognitive and biological models 
of PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). Future research would benefit from comparing 
several dependent measures of fear in conditioning (SCR, startle and threat 
expectancy), examining retention of fear extinction learning over time, and 
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investigating whether other cognitive variables mediate fear extinction learning in 
PTSD.  
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Appendix A 
Measures and Questionnaires 
Appendix A1 
Traumatic Experience Questionnaire (TEQ) 
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Appendix A2 
PTSD CheckList – Civilian Version (PCL-C) 
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Appendix A3 
Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21) 
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Medical Questionnaire
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Appendix A5 
Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test 
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Appendix A6 
Catastrophic Cognitions Questionnaire – Modified (CCQ-M) 
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Appendix A7 
Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory (PTCI) 
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Appendix C 
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Appendix D 
Supplementary Results 
Appendix D1 
 
Table D1 
Sidak-Adjusted Post-Hoc Pairwise Comparisons for Age and Clinical Measure 
ANOVAs Including p-values and 95% Confidence Intervals 
                    95% Confidence Intervals 
Variable   Comparison      p       Lower Bound      Upper Bound 
 
Age   PTSD & TEC           .054  -.113  18.77       
   PTSD & NTEC    .012*     2.09  20.98 
   TEC & NTEC    .924  -7.46  11.88 
PCL-C     PTSD & TEC        <.001**        20.80  32.95 
   PTSD & NTEC  <.001**       25.16  37.32 
   TEC & NTEC    .246  -1.86  10.59 
DASS   
- Depression   PTSD & TEC        <.001**         2.24    9.02  
   PTSD & NTEC  <.001**         3.29  10.07  
   TEC & NTEC     .842                -2.42    4.53 
- Anxiety  PTSD & TEC        <.001**         3.82    8.06 
   PTSD & NTEC  <.001**         4.14    8.34 
   TEC & NTEC    .978   -1.85    2.49 
- Stress        PTSD & TEC        <.001**         3.88    9.98 
   PTSD & NTEC  <.001**         5.46  11.56 
   TEC & NTEC    .523   -1.54    4.70 
 
 
 
*p < .05. **p < .01. Note. PCL-C = PTSD Check List Civilian Version; DASS = Depression, 
Anxiety and Stress Scales 
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Appendix D2 
 
Table D2 
Sidak-Adjusted Post-Hoc Pairwise Comparisons for Posttraumatic Cognitions 
Inventory ANOVAs, Including p-values and 95% Confidence Intervals 
                   
               95% Confidence Intervals 
Variable   Comparison      p       Lower Bound      Upper Bound 
 
PTCI Total       PTSD & TEC        .008**     6.81  56.22  
   PTSD & NTEC             <.001**         16.76  66.17 
   TEC & NTEC  .709  -15.37               35.26 
PTCI Self           PTSD & TEC       .015*       .15                 1.77  
   PTSD & NTEC  .003**       .35   1.97 
   TEC & NTEC  .916     -.63   1.03 
PTCI World           PTSD & TEC        .060   -1.98    .03  
   PTSD & NTEC             <.001**          1.06  3.08 
   TEC & NTEC  .035*      .06  2.12 
PTCI Self-Blame        PTSD & TEC        .130    -.18  1.95 
   PTSD & NTEC  .541    -.54  1.59  
   TEC & NTEC  .805  -1.45  1.45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*p < .05. **p < .01. Note. PTCI = Posttraumatic Cognitions Inventory 
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Appendix D3 
 
Table D3 
Sidak-Adjusted Post-Hoc Pairwise Comparisons of Threat Expectancy Across Trials 
for Phases in which ANOVAs Identified a Significant Main Trial Effect 
                    
                95% Confidence Intervals 
Phase      Trial Comparison (a and b)^     p       Lower Bound      Upper Bound 
 
Habituation       1 and 2        .486  -.30  1.22  
   1 and 3   .441  -.30  1.30  
   1 and 4   .048*  .01  1.65  
   2 and 3   1.00  -.29  .37 
   2 and 4   .228  -.11  .85 
   3 and 4   .171  -.08  .73 
 
Early Extinction          1 and 2          .080   -.05  1.43  
   1 and 3   <.001**          .87  2.85 
   1 and 4   <.001**        1.73  3.87 
   1 and 5   <.001**        2.34  4.47 
   2 and 3   <.001**          .44  1.89 
   2 and 4   <.001**        1.21  3.00 
   2 and 5   <.001**   1.75  3.67      
   3 and 4   <.001**          .41  1.48 
   3 and 5   <.001**          .91  2.19 
   4 and 5     .005**    .13  1.08 
 
Late Extinction           1 and 2          .002**    .32  2.09 
   1 and 3   <.001**        1.16  3.11 
   1 and 4   <.001**        1.37  3.48 
   1 and 5   <.001**        1.60  3.72 
   2 and 3   <.001**          .38  1.47 
   2 and 4   <.001**          .55  1.89 
   2 and 5   <.001**          .73  2.17 
   3 and 4     .033*    .01    .56 
   3 and 5     .002**    .14    .91 
   4 and 5     .350                -.09    .57 
*p < .05. **p < .01. Note. ^These figures are based on the mean difference in threat expectancy 
ratings over 2 trials (trial a minus trial b). 
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Appendix D4 
 
Table D4 
Sidak-Adjusted Post-Hoc Pairwise Comparisons of the Condition by Trial 
Interaction of Threat Expectancy for Phases in which ANOVAs Identified a 
Significant Condition by Trial Effect.                               
            
               95% Confidence Intervals 
Phase  Trial           Condition      p       Lower Bound      Upper Bound 
   Comparison (a and b)^   
 
Acquisition 1         CS+ and CS-    .018     .17   1.78 
     CS- and CS+    .018  -1.78    -.17 
  2 CS+ and CS-  <.001**        4.12   6.64 
     CS- and CS+  <.001**        -6.54  -4.12 
  3 CS+ and CS-  <.001**         5.50   8.10 
     CS- and CS+  <.001**        -8.10  -5.50  
  4 CS+ and CS-  <.001**         6.06   8.46 
     CS- and CS+  <.001**        -8.46  -6.06  
  5 CS+ and CS-  <.001**         7.50   9.24 
     CS- and CS+  <.001**        -9.24  -7.50 
 
Early Extinction    1         CS+ and CS-  <.001**         2.08   4.37  
     CS- and CS+  <.001**        -4.37  -2.08 
  2 CS+ and CS-  <.001**           .91   2.93 
     CS- and CS+  <.001**        -2.93    -.91 
  3 CS+ and CS-  <.001**         1.29   3.20 
     CS- and CS+  <.001**        -3.20  -1.29 
  4 CS+ and CS-    .001**     .67   2.31 
     CS- and CS+    .001**  -2.31   -.67 
  5 CS+ and CS-    .004**     .42   2.16 
     CS- and CS+    .004**  -2.16   -.42 
 
 
 
*p < .05. **p < .01. Note. ^These figures are based on the mean difference in threat expectancy 
between two conditions (condition a minus condition b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 
 
Appendix D5 
 
 
Table D5 
Sidak-Adjusted Post-Hoc Pairwise Comparisons of the Trial by Condition 
Interaction of Threat Expectancy in the Early Extinction Phase 
                    
                95% Confidence Intervals 
Condition     Trial Comparison (a and b)^     p      Lower Bound      Upper Bound 
 
CS+           1 and 2          .005**      .28  2.41  
   1 and 3   <.001**          1.18  3.51 
   1 and 4   <.001**          2.24  5.11 
   1 and 5   <.001**          2.94  5.80 
   2 and 3     .028*            .06  1.94  
   2 and 4   <.001**          1.19  3.46 
   2 and 5   <.001**     1.86  4.19  
   3 and 4      .001**            .42  2.22 
   3 and 5   <.001**          1.06  2.98 
   4 and 5     .414    -.33  1.73 
 
CS-            1 and 2          1.000   -.92  1.01   
   1 and 3   .029*          .09  2.65 
   1 and 4   <.001**          .71  3.16 
   1 and 5   <.001**        1.11  3.76 
   2 and 3   .001**          .42  2.23  
   2 and 4   <.001**          .83  2.95 
   2 and 5   <.001**        1.27  3.52  
   3 and 4     .488   -.31  1.44 
   3 and 5     .005**    .23  1.91 
   4 and 5     .231        -.14  1.14 
    
 
 
 
*p < .05. **p < .01. Note. ^These figures are based on the mean difference in threat expectancy 
ratings over 2 trials (trial a minus trial b). 
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Appendix E 
SPSS Output 
 
